Noisy Max and Sparse Vector are selection algorithms for differential privacy and serve as building blocks for more complex algorithms. In this paper we show that both algorithms can release additional information for free (i.e., at no additional privacy cost). Noisy Max is used to return the approximate maximizer among a set of queries. We show that it can also release for free the noisy gap between the approximate maximizer and runner-up. Sparse Vector is used to return a set of queries that are approximately larger than a fixed threshold. We show that it can adaptively control its privacy budget (use less budget for queries that are likely to be much larger than the threshold) and simultaneously release for free a noisy gap between the selected queries and the threshold. It has long been suspected that Sparse Vector can release additional information, but prior attempts had incorrect proofs. Our version is proved using randomness alignment, a proof template framework borrowed from the program verification literature. We show how the free extra information in both mechanisms can be used to improve the utility of differentially private algorithms.
INTRODUCTION
Industry and government agencies are increasingly adopting differential privacy [17] to protect the confidentiality of users who provide data. Current and planned major applications include data gathering by Google [21, 7] , Apple [41] , and Microsoft [13] ; database querying by Uber [27] ; and publication of population statistics at the U.S. Census Bureau [33, 9, 24, 2] .
The accuracy of differentially private data releases is very important in these applications. One way to improve accuracy is to increase the value of the privacy parameter , known as the privacy loss budget, as it provides a tradeoff between an algorithm's utility and its privacy protections. However, values of that are deemed too high can subject a company to criticisms of not providing enough privacy [40] . For this reason, researchers invest significant effort in tuning algorithms [11, 45, 28, 1, 38, 22] and privacy analyses [8, 37, 38, 20] to provide better utility while using smaller privacy budgets.
Differentially private algorithms are built out of smaller components called mechanisms [35] . Popular mechanisms include the Laplace Mechanism [17] , Geometric Mechanism [23] , Noisy Max [19] and Sparse Vector [19, 32] . As we will explain in this paper, the latter two mechanisms, Noisy Max and Sparse Vector, inadvertently throw away information that is useful for designing accurate algorithms. Our contribution is to present novel variants of these mechanisms that provide more functionality at the same privacy cost (under pure differential privacy).
Given a set of queries, Noisy Max returns the identity (not value) of the query that is likely to have the largest valueit adds noise to each query answer and returns the index of the query with the largest noisy value. Meanwhile, Sparse Vector takes a stream of queries and a predefined public threshold T . It tries to return the identities of the first k queries that are probably larger than the threshold. To do so, it adds noise to the threshold. Then, as it sequentially processes each query, it outputs " " or "⊥", depending on whether the noisy value of the current query is larger or smaller than the noisy threshold. The mechanism terminates after k " " outputs.
In recent work [43] , using program verification tools, Wang et al. showed that Sparse Vector can provide additional information at no additional cost to privacy. That is, when Sparse Vector returns " " for a query, it can also return the gap between its noisy value and the noisy threshold. 1 We refer to their algorithm as Sparse-Vector-with-Gap.
Inspired by this program verification work, we propose many novel variations of Sparse Vector and Noisy Max. For Sparse Vector, we show that in addition to releasing this gap information, even stronger improvements are possible -we present an adaptive version that can answer more queries than before by controlling how much privacy budget it uses to answer each query. The intuition is that we would like to spend less of our privacy budget for queries that are probably much larger than the threshold (compared to queries that are probably closer to the threshold). A careful accounting of the privacy impact shows that this is possible and our experiments confirm that Adaptive-Sparse-Vectorwith-Gap can answer many more queries than the prior versions [32, 19, 43] at the same privacy cost.
For Noisy Max, we show that it too inadvertently throws away information. Specifically, at no additional cost to privacy, it can release an estimate of the gap between the largest and second largest queries (we call the resulting mechanism Noisy-Max-with-Gap). We then generalize this result to Noisy Top-K -showing that one can release an estimate of the identities of the k largest queries and, at no extra privacy cost, release noisy estimates of the pairwise gaps (dif-ferences) among the top k + 1 queries. This is more accurate than simply running Noisy-Max-with-Gap for k times.
The extra information that these mechanisms can provide opens up new directions in the construction of differentially private algorithms. We present some of these applications in this paper. For instance, one common task is to select the approximate top-k queries and then use additional privacy loss budget to provide estimates of their values. We show how the noisy gap information from our top-k mechanism can be used inside such an algorithm to provide more accuracy for this task (we give similar results for Sparse Vector).
We prove our results using the alignment of random variables technique [32, 11, 43, 44] , which is based on the following question: if we change the input to a program, how must we change its random variables so that output remains the same? This technique was used in several human-readable [32, 11, 19] and machine-readable [43, 44] proofs. However, it is also often used incorrectly (as discussed by Lyu et al. [32] ). Thus a secondary contribution of our work is to lay out the precise steps and conditions that must be checked and to provide helpful lemmas that ensure these conditions are met. The resulting proof template simplifies the process of proving the correctness of such mechanisms. In addition to using it to prove the correctness of our mechanisms, we also use it to provide the first human-readable proof of Sparse-Vector-with-Gap.
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To summarize, our contributions are as follows:
• We provide a simplified template for writing correctness proofs for intricate differentially private algorithms.
• Using this technique, we propose and prove the correctness of three new mechanisms: (1) Adaptive-SparseVector-with-Gap, (2) Noisy-Max-with-Gap and (3) NoisyTop-K-with-Gap. These algorithms improve on the original versions of Sparse Vector, Noisy Max, and Noisy Top-K (i.e. they provide more information at the same privacy cost). We also provide the first human-readable proof of (non-adaptive) Sparse-Vector-with-Gap, which previously only had a machine-readable proof [43] .
• We demonstrate some of the uses of the gap information that is provided by these new mechanisms. When an algorithm needs to use Noisy Max or Sparse Vector to select some queries and then measure them (i.e., obtain their noisy answers), we show how the gap information from our versions can be used to improve the accuracy of the noisy measurements. We also show how the gap information in Sparse Vector can be used to estimate the confidence that a query's true answer really is larger than the threshold.
• We empirically evaluate these new mechanisms on a variety of datasets to demonstrate their improved utility.
In Section 2, we discuss related work. We present background and notation in Section 3. We present simplified proof templates for randomness alignment in Section 4. We present novel variants of Noisy Max in Section 5 and novel variants of Sparse Vector in Section 6. We present experiments in Section 7, key proofs in Section 8 and conclusions in Section 9. The rest of our proofs can be found in the Appendix.
RELATED WORK
Selection algorithms, such as Exponential Mechanism [34, 39] , Sparse Vector [19, 32] , and Noisy Max [19] are used to select a set of items (typically queries) from a much larger set. They have applications in hyperparameter tuning [11, 31] , iterative construction of microdata [25] , feature selection [42] , frequent itemset mining [6] , exploring a privacy/accuracy tradeoff [30] , data pre-processing [12] , etc.
Various generalizations have been proposed [30, 5, 42, 39, 10, 31] . Liu and Talwar [31] and Raskhodnikova and Smith [39] extend the exponential mechanism for arbitrary sensitivity queries. Beimel et al. [5] and Thakurta and Smith [42] use the propose-test-release framework [16] to find a gap between the best and second best queries and, if the gap is large enough, release the identity of the best query. These two algorithms rely on a relaxation of differential privacy called approximate ( , δ)-differential privacy [15] and can fail to return an answer (in which case they return ⊥). Our algorithms work with pure -differential privacy. Chaudhuri et al. [10] also proposed a large margin mechanism (with approximate differential privacy) which finds a large gap separating top queries from the rest and returns one of them.
There have also been unsuccessful attempts to generalize selection algorithms such as the Sparse Vector (incorrect versions are catalogued by Lyu et al. [32] ), which has sparked innovations in program verification for differential privacy (e.g., [4, 3, 44, 43] ). One technique, known as Randomness Alignment [44] is a simplification of probabilistic coupling [4] , and shows promise for helping automation of privacy proofs [44, 3] . It considers what changes need to be made to random variables in order to make two executions of a program, with different inputs, produce the same output. Such ideas have appeared in handwritten proofs [11, 19, 32] and were mis-used in incorrect proofs [32] . In this paper, we provide a technique called Randomness Alignment Templates which simplifies the manual construction of correct human-readable proofs (e.g., [11, 32] ) by removing a lot of boilerplate from the proof.
NOTATION AND BACKGROUND
In this paper, we use the following notation. D and D refer to databases. We use the notation D ∼ D to represent adjacent databases.
3 M denotes a randomized algorithm whose input is a database. Ω denotes the range of M and ω ∈ Ω denotes a specific output of M . We use E ⊆ Ω to denote a set of possible outputs. Because M is randomized, it also relies on a random noise vector H ∈ R ∞ (which usually consists of independent zero-mean Laplace random variables). This noise sequence is infinite, but of course M will only use a finite-length prefix of H. When we need to draw attention to the noise, we use the notation M (D, H) to indicate the execution of M with database D and randomness coming from H. Otherwise we use the notation M (D). Define SM,D:E = {H | M (D, H) ∈ E} to be the set of noise vectors that allow M , on input D, to produce an output in the set E ⊆ Ω. To avoid overburdening the notation, we write SD:E for SM,D:E and S D :E for S M,D :E when M is clear from the context. When E consists of a single point ω, we write these sets as SD:ω and S D :ω . This notation is summarized in the table below. 
input noise vector Ω the space of all output of M ω a possible output; ω ∈ Ω E a set of possible outputs;
Formal Privacy
Differential privacy [17, 14, 19] is currently the gold standard for releasing privacy-preserving information about a database. It has a parameter > 0 known as the privacy loss budget. The smaller it is, the more privacy is provided. Differential privacy bounds the effect of one record on the output of the algorithm (for small , the probability of any output is barely affected by any person's record).
Definition 1 (Pure Differential Privacy [14] ). Given an > 0, a randomized algorithm M with output space Ω satisfies (pure) -differential privacy if for all E ⊆ Ω and all pairs of adjacent databases D ∼ D , the following holds:
where the probability is only over the randomness of H.
With the notation in Table 1 , the differential privacy condition from Equation (1) is P(SD:E) ≤ e P(S D :E ).
Differential privacy enjoys the following nice properties:
• Resilience to Post-Processing. If we apply an algorithm A to the output of an -differentially private algorithm M , then the composite algorithm A • M still satisfies -differential privacy. In other words, privacy is not reduced by post-processing.
• Composition. If M1, M2, . . . , M k satisfy differential privacy with privacy loss budgets 1, . . . , k , the algorithm that runs all of them and releases their outputs satisfies
Many differentially private algorithms take advantage of the Laplace mechanism [34] , which provides a noisy answer to a vector-valued query q based on its L1 global sensitivity ∆q, defined as follows:
Definition 2 (L1 Global Sensitivity [19] ). The global sensitivity of a query q is ∆q = sup D∼D q(D) − q(D ) 1.
Theorem 1 (Laplace Mechanism [17] ). Given a privacy loss budget , consider the mechanism that returns q(D) + H, where H is a vector of independent random samples from the Laplace(∆q/ ) distribution with mean 0 and scale parameter ∆q/ . This Laplace mechanism satisfies -differential privacy.
If the output of q only consists of multiples of some number γ, then one can use the discrete Laplace mechanism:
Theorem 2 (Discrete Laplace [23] ). Let q be a vector-valued query, where each component of q(D) is always a multiple of γ. Given a privacy loss budget , consider the mechanism that returns q(D) + H, where H is a vector of independent random samples from the DiscLaplace(∆q/ ) distribution having probability mass function f (k) = 
RANDOMNESS ALIGNMENT
To establish that the algorithms we propose are differentially private, we use an idea called randomness alignment that previously had been used to prove the privacy of a variety of sophisticated algorithms [19, 32, 11] and incorporated into verification/synthesis tools [44, 43, 3] . While powerful, this technique is also easy to use incorrectly [32] , as there are many technical conditions that need to be checked. In this section, we present results (namely Lemma 1) that significantly simplify this process and make it easy to prove the correctness of our proposed algorithms.
In general, to prove -differential privacy for an algorithm M , one needs to show 
Special Properties of Alignments
Not all alignments can be used to prove differential privacy. In this section we discuss some additional properties that help prove differential privacy.
We first make two mild assumptions about the mechanism M : (1) it terminates with probability 4 one and (2) based on the output of M , we can determine how many random variables it used. The vast majority of differentially private algorithms in the literature satisfy these properties.
We next define two properties of alignments: whether they are acyclic and what their cost is. 
Essentially, a local alignment φ D,D ,ω is acyclic if there is some ordering of the variables so that η j is the sum of ηj and a function of the variables that came earlier in the ordering. The local alignments φ D,D , and φ D,D ,⊥ from Example 2 are both acyclic (in general, each local alignment function is allowed to have its own specific ordering and differentiable functions ψ 
The following lemma uses those properties to establish that M satisfies -differential privacy. Lemma 1. Let M be an algorithm with input randomness H = (η1, η2, . . . ). If the following conditions are satisfied, then M satisfies -differential privacy.
i. M terminates with probability 1.
ii. The number of random variables used by M can be determined from its output.
iii. Each ηi is generated independently from a Laplace(αi) or DiscLaplace(αi) distribution.
iv. For every D ∼ D and ω there exists a local alignment
v. For each D ∼ D the number of distinct local alignments is countable. That is, the set {φ D,D ,ω | ω ∈ Ω} is countable (i.e., for many choices of ω we get the same exact alignment function).
We defer the proof to Section 8. 
Warmup: Sparse Vector with Gap
As a warmup demonstration of the power of Lemma 1, we provide the first human-readable proof of Sparse-Vectorwith-Gap [43] . The mechanism of Wang et al. [43] is an imAlgorithm 1: Sparse Vector (with Gap [43] ). For the original SVT [19, 32] , remove the box on Line 8. input : q: a list of queries of global sensitivity 1 D: database, : privacy budget, T : threshold k: bound on above-T answers to output
provement over the original Sparse Vector Technique (SVT) [18, 26] (providing strictly more information at the same privacy cost). The original SVT is a differentially private mechanism whose input is a sequence of queries with sensitivity 1. It estimates the identities of the first k queries whose values are over a public threshold T . The original mechanism adds noise to the threshold and to each query. Then as it processes the queries in order, it returns if the noisy query is above the noisy threshold and ⊥ if it is below. It stops after outputting for k times. Wang et al. [43] showed that in addition to outputting , it can also output at no extra cost to privacy an estimate of the gap between the noisy query (for which was produced) and the noisy threshold. Both versions of the mechanism are shown in Algorithm 1, with the changes proposed by Wang et al. [43] appearing in the box on line 8 (note it re-uses the same noise as Line 7).
Wang et al. [43] verified the correctness of this mechanism using novel program verification techniques based on a complex type system; this method could not produce a humanreadable proof. Lemma 1 can be easily used to prove the correctness by simply specifying a set of local alignments.
Local alignment. To create a local alignment for each D ∼ D , first let H = (η, η1, η2, . . . ) where η is the noise added to threshold T and ηi is the noise that should be added to the i th query qi (if execution ever reaches that point). We view the output ω = (ω1, . . . , ωs) as a variable-length sequence where each ωi is either ⊥ or the nonnegative gap (we omit the as it is redundant).
Let Iω = {i | wi ∈ R ≥0 }. It is the index set of overthreshold queries (i.e. the ones for which a gap is returned). For H ∈ SD:ω (see notation in Table 1 
That is, to make sure M (D , H ) returns the same output as M (D, H), we increase by one the noise added to the threshold (η = η + 1) while keeping the noise added to belowthreshold queries the same (hence if qi(D) + ηi is less than T + η then qi(D ) + η i is less than T + η ). To make sure the over-threshold queries qj remain above the threshold with the same gap, we need to modify the noise η j so that
Lemma 2. Let M be the Sparse-Vector-with-Gap mechanism. For all D ∼ D and ω, the functions φ D,D ,ω defined above
The proof can be found in the Appendix. Once the local alignment has been constructed, we can use Lemma 1 to prove privacy as follows. 
The first inequality follows from the triangle inequality and sensitivity 1 of the queries:
The second inequality follows from the fact that there are at most k above-the-threshold queries answered so |Iω| ≤ k. Thus all local alignments have cost ≤ .
IMPROVING NOISY MAX
In this section, we present novel variations of the Noisy Max mechanism [19] . Given a list of queries with sensitivity 1, the purpose of Noisy Max is to estimate the identity (i.e., index) of the largest query. We show that, in addition to releasing this index, it is possible to release a numerical estimate of the gap between the values of the largest and second largest queries. This extra information comes at no additional cost to privacy (meaning that the original Noisy Max mechanism threw away useful information). We then generalize this result to a noisy top-k mechanism and show how the free gap information can be used to improve algorithms that use this building block. Specifically, when an algorithm asks for the identities of the top-k queries and then asks for the noisy values of these queries (i.e., measurements), we show that the free gap information can be combined with the measurements to improve their accuracy.
Noisy-Max-with-Gap
Both the original Noisy Max mechanism and our improved Noisy-Max-with-Gap are shown in Algorithm 2 (for the original version, remove the boxes). The function arg max2 in the pseudocode returns the index of the largest and second largest elements. Both mechanisms take in n queries, each having sensitivity 1. Both mechanisms add the same amount of Laplace noise to each query. The original mechanism then returns the index of the query with the largest noisy value. Our improved version returns this index along with the difference in noisy values between the largest and second largest queries. Our claim is that both mechanisms have exactly the same privacy cost, yet Noisy-Max-with-Gap has more utility because it provides more information.
Algorithm 2: Noisy-Max-with-Gap (for the original Noisy Max, remove the boxes) input: q: a list of n queries of global sensitivity 1 D: database, : privacy budget 1 function NoisyMax(q, D, ):
The original Noisy Max mechanism satisfies -differential privacy. In the special case that all the qi are counting queries 5 then it satisfies /2-differential privacy [19] . We will show the same properties for Noisy-Max-with-Gap. However, first it is important to discuss the difference between the theoretical analysis of Noisy Max [19] and its practical implementation on finite-precision computers.
Implementation issues. The analysis of the original Noisy
Max mechanism assumed the use of true Laplace noise (i.e., a continuous distribution) so that ties are impossible between the largest and second largest noisy queries [19] . On finite precision computers, ties are possible (breaking the privacy proof [19] ) and furthermore, common implementations of Laplace noise are known to be insecure [36] . One way to generate a secure approximation to the Laplace distribution on finite-precision computers is to select a small base γ (e.g., a negative power of two), round a query answer to the nearest multiple of γ, and then add to it the Discrete Laplace distribution with base γ (Theorem 2). In the Appendix, we show that if there are n queries with sensitivity 1 and DiscLapalce(1/ ) noise with base γ is added to each of them, the probability of a tie is upper bounded by δ = γn 2 . Thus this is an upper bound on the probability that the differential privacy guarantees will fail. Typically, one would expect γ to be close to machine epsilon (e.g., ≈ 2 −52 ) so the probability of a tie is negligible. In this section we will also analyze our algorithms under the assumption of continuous noise, and hence the privacy guarantees will also fail with this negligible probability δ (formally, this is known as approximate ( , δ)-differential privacy [15] ).
Local alignment. To prove the privacy of Algorithm 2, we need to create local alignment functions. Note that our mechanism only uses n random variables. Let H = (η1, η2, . . . , ηn) where ηi is the noise that should be added to the i th query. We view the output ω = (jω, gω) as a pair where jω is the index of the noisy maximizer and gω is the noisy gap between the maximizer and the runner-up. As discussed in the implementation issues, we will base our analysis on continuous noise (so that there are no ties when selecting the maximizer). Thus the noisy gap is strictly positive (i.e., gω > 0). Let Iω = {jω} be the singleton set containing the maximizer and set I c ω = {1, . . . , n} \ Iω (i.e., the first n integers with jω removed). Let D ∼ D be any adjacent pair of databases and let qi (resp., q i ) be the value of the i th query when evaluated on D (resp.,
The main idea behind this alignment is that we don't want to change the noise added to the losing queries. This means that with database D and noise H, the value of the runner up query is max The proof is in the Appendix.
Noisy-Top-K-with-Gap
The Noisy Max mechanism can easily be extended to a top-k version: use k times as much noise and return the indices of the top k noisy queries. We show that free noisy gap information can be included as well. Let arg max k+1 be the function that returns the indices of the k + 1 largest elements (in decreasing order). The following mechanism, which we call Noisy-Top-K-with-Gap, releases the estimated indices of the top-k queries along with noisy gaps between them. 
We note that keeping the noisy gaps hidden does not decrease the privacy cost (same as with Noisy-Max-withGap). Furthermore, this algorithm gives estimates of the pairwise gaps between any pair of the k queries it selects. For example, suppose we are interested in estimating the gap between the a th largest and b th largest queries (where a < b ≤ k). This is equal to = (η1, η2, . . . , ηn) where ηi is the noise that should be added to the i th query (note that the algorithm only uses n random variables). As discussed in the implementation notes at the beginning of this section, we analyze the case of continuous distributions, so that the probability of ties among the top-k noisy queries is 0. Thus each gap is positive: gi > 0.
Let Iω = {j1, . . . , j k } and I 
Note that it is of the same form as the local alignment function (3); the only difference is that Iω now has k elements instead of 1. The idea behind this local alignment is similar: we want to keep the noise of the losing queries the same (when the input is D or its neighbor D ). But, for each of the k selected queries, we want to modify its noise to account for how much the query changes (qi − q i ) as we go from D to D and how much the value of the k + 1 th noisy query (i.e. the value of the best losing noisy query) changes, which is max The proof is in the Appendix.
Utilizing Gap Information
Let us consider one scenario that takes advantage of the gap information. Suppose a data analyst is interested in the identities and values of the top-k queries. A typical approach would be to split the privacy budget in half -use /2 of the budget to identify the top-k queries using Noisy-Top-K-with-Gap. The remaining /2 budget is evenly divided between the selected queries and is used to obtain noisy measurements (i.e. add Laplace(2k/ ) noise to each query answer). These measurements will have variance 8k 2 / 2 . In this section we show how to use the gap information from Noisy-Top-K-with-Gap and postprocessing to improve the accuracy of these measurements.
Let αi = qi(D) + ξi be the noisy measurements, where ξi is a Laplace(2k/ ) random variable. Let q1, . . . , q k be the top-k queries that were returned by Algorithm 3 and let gi = qi(D)−qi+1(D)+ηi−ηi+1 be the gap variables returned by the mechanism, where each ηi is a Laplace(4k/ ) random variable (recall the mechanism was run with a privacy budget of /2).
Our goal is then to find the best linear unbiased estimate (BLUE) [29] β of q in terms of the measurements α and gap information g. 
For proof, see the Appendix. Even though this is a matrix multiplication, it is easy to see that it translates into the following algorithm that is linear in k:
Now, each βi is an estimate of the value of qi(D). How does it compare to the direct measurement αi (which has variance 8k 2 / 2 )? The following result compares the expected error of βi (which used the direct measurements and the gap information) with the expected error of using only the direct measurements (i.e., αi only).
For proof, see the Appendix. Since lim k→∞ 4k+1 5k
, we see that the free gap information helps achieve an improvement of up to 20%. Our experiments in Section 7 confirm this theoretical result.
IMPROVING SPARSE VECTOR
In this section we return to the Sparse Vector technique. We propose a novel variant that can answer more queries than both the original Sparse Vector [19, 32] and the SparseVector-with-Gap of Wang et al. [43] . We also discuss how the free gap information can be used.
Adaptive-Sparse-Vector-with-Gap
The Sparse Vector techniques are designed to solve the following problem in a privacy-preserving way: given a stream of queries (with sensitivity 1), find the first k queries whose answers are larger than a public threshold T . This is done by adding noise to the queries and threshold and finding the first k queries whose noisy answers exceed the noisy threshold. Sometimes this procedure creates a feeling of regretif these k queries are much larger than the threshold, we could have used more noise (hence consumed less privacy budget) to achieve the same result. In this section, we show that Sparse Vector can be made adaptive -so that it will probably use more noise (less privacy budget) for the larger queries. This means if the first k queries are very large, it will still have privacy budget left over to find additional queries that are likely to be over the threshold. Our Adaptive Sparse Vector is shown in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: Adaptive-Sparse-Vector-with-Gap input : q: a list of queries of global sensitivity 1 D: database, : privacy budget, T : threshold k: adaptive SVT can answer up to 2k queries. 1 function AdaptiveSparseVector(q, D, T , k, ): The main idea behind this algorithm is that, given a target privacy budget and a k, the algorithm will create three noise scale parameters: 0, 1, 2 (with 1 < 2) that are used as follows. First, the algorithm adds Laplace(1/ 0) noise to the threshold and consumes 0 of the privacy budget. Then, when a query comes in, the algorithm first adds a lot of noise (i.e., Laplace(1/ 1)) to the query. The first "if" branch checks if this value is much larger than the noisy threshold (i.e. checks if the gap is ≥ σ for some 6 σ). If so, then it outputs the following three items: (1) , (2) the noisy gap, and (3) the amount of privacy budget used (which is 2 1). The use of alignments will show that failing this "if" branch consumes no privacy budget. If the first "if" branch fails, then the algorithm adds more moderate noise to the query answer (i.e., Laplace(1/ 2)). If this noisy value is larger than the noisy threshold, the algorithm outputs: (1 ) , (2 ) the noisy gap, and (3 ) the amount of privacy budget consumed (i.e., 2 2). If this "if" condition also fails, then the algorithm outputs: (1 ) ⊥ and (2 ) the privacy budget consumed (0 in this case).
To summarize, for each query, if the top branch succeeds then the privacy budget consumed is 2 1, if the middle branch succeeds, the privacy cost is 2 2, and if the bottom branch succeeds, there is no additional privacy cost. These properties can be easily seen by focusing on the local alignment -if M (D, H) produces a certain output, how much does H need to change to get a noise vector H so that M (D , H ) returns the same exact output.
Local alignment. To create a local alignment for each pair D ∼ D , let H = (η, ξ1, η1, ξ2, η2, . . .) where η is the noise added to the threshold T , and ξi (resp. ηi) is the noise that should be added to the i th query qi in Line 8 (resp. Line 11), if execution ever reaches that point. We view the output ω = (ω1, . . . , ωs) as a variable-length sequence where each ωi is either ⊥ or a nonnegative gap (we omit the as it is redundant), together with a tag ∈ {0, 2 1, 2 2} indicating which branch ωi is from (and the privacy budget consumed to output ωi). Let Iω = {i | tag(wi) = 2 1} and Jω = {i | tag(wi) = 2 2}. That is, Iω is the set of indexes where the output is a gap from the top branch, and Jω is the set of indexes where the output is a gap from the middle branch. For H ∈ SD:ω define φ D,D ,ω (H) = H = (η , ξ 1 , η 1 , ξ 2 , η 2 , . . .) where
In other words, we add 1 to the noise that was added to the threshold (thus if the noisy q(D) failed a specific branch, the noisy q(D ) will continue to fail it because of the higher noisy threshold). If a noisy q(D) succeeded in a specific branch, we adjust the query's noise so that the noisy version of q(D ) will succeed in that same branch. The proof can be found in the Appendix. Clearly this algorithm can be easily extended with multiple additional "if" branches. For simplicity we do not include such variations. In our setting, 1 = 2/2 so, theoretically, if queries are very far from the threshold, our adaptive version of Sparse Vector will be able to find twice as many of them as the non-adaptive version.
Utilizing Gap Information
When Sparse-Vector-with-Gap or Adaptive-Sparse-Vectorwith-Gap returns a gap γi for a query qi, we can add to it the public threshold T . This means γi + T is an estimate of the value of qi(D). We can ask two questions: how can we improve the accuracy of this estimate and how can we be confident that the true answer qi(D) is really larger than the threshold T ?
Lower Confidence Interval. Recall that the randomness in the gap in Sparse-Vector-with-Gap (Algorithm 1) is of the form ηi − η where η and ηi are independent zero mean Laplace variables with scale 1/ 0 and 1/ 1. The random variable ηi − η has the following lower tail bound:
Lemma 7. For any t ≥ 0 we have
For proof see the Appendix. For any confidence level, say 95%, we can use this result to find a number t.95 such that P((ηi − η) ≥ −t.95) = .95. This is a lower confidence bound, so that the true value qi(D) is ≥ our estimated value γi + T minus t.95 with probability 0.95.
Improving accuracy. To improve accuracy, one can split the privacy budget in half. The first half, 1 ≡ /2 can be used to run Sparse-Vector-with-Gap (or Adaptive-SparseVector-with-Gap) and the second half 2 ≡ /2 can be used to provide an independent noisy measurement of the selected queries (i.e. if we selected k queries, we add Laplace(k/ 2) noise to each one). Suppose the selected queries are q1, . . . , q k , the noisy gaps are γ1, . . . , γ k and the independent noisy measurements are α1, . . . , α k .
The noisy estimates can be combined together with the gaps to get improved estimates βi of qi(D) in the standard way (inverse-weighting by variance):
.
As shown in [32] , the optimal budget allocation between threshold noise and query noises within SVT (and therefore also Sparse-Vector-with-Gap) is the ratio 1 : (2k) 3 / 2 . Also, we know Var(αi) = 8k 2 / 2 . Therefore,
Since lim k→∞
, the improvement in accuracy approaches 20% as k increases. Our experiments confirm this improvement.
EXPERIMENTS
We now evaluate the algorithms proposed in this paper.
Datasets
For evaluation, we used the two real datasets from [32] : BMP-POS, Kosarak and a synthetic dataset T40I10D100K created by the generator from the IBM Almaden Quest research group. These datasets are collections of transactions (each transaction is a set of items). In our experiments, the queries correspond to the counts of each item (i.e. how many transactions contained item #23?) The statistics of the datasets are listed below. 
Gap Information + Postprocessing
The first set of experiments is to measure how gap information can help us improve estimates in selected queries. We use the setup of Sections 5.3 and 6.2. That is, a data analyst splits the privacy budget in half. She uses the first half to select k queries (using Noisy-Top-K-with-Gap or Sparse-Vector-with-Gap) and then uses the remaining privacy budget to obtain independent noisy measurements of each selected query.
If one were unaware that gap information came for free, one would just use those noisy measurements as estimates for the query answers. The error of this approach is the gap-free baseline. However, since the gap information does come for free, we can use the postprocessing described in Sections 5.3 and 6.2 to improve accuracy (we call this latter approach Sparse-Vector-with-Gap with Measures and NoisyTop-K-with-Gap with Measures).
We first evaluate the percent improvement in mean squared error (MSE) of the postprocessing approach compared to the gap-free baseline and compare this improvement to our theoretical analysis. As discussed in Section 6.2, we set the budget allocation ratio within the Sparse-Vector-with-Gap algorithm (i.e., the budget allocation between the threshold and queries in Algorithm 1) to be 1 : (2k) 2 3 -such a ratio is recommended in [32] for the original Sparse Vector. The threshold used for Sparse-Vector-with-Gap is set to the 95% quantile in each dataset. All numbers plotted are averaged over 20,000 runs.
Our theoretical analysis in Sections 5.3 and 6.2 suggested that the improvements can reach up to 20% as k increases. This is confirmed in Figures 1a, 1b, 1c for Sparse-Vectorwith-Gap and Figures 1d, 1e, 1f for our top-k algorithm. These figures plot the theoretical and empirical percent improvement in MSE as a function of k and show the power of the free gap information.
We also generated corresponding plots where k is held fixed and the total privacy budget is varied. For SparseVector-with-Gap, Figures 2a, 2b , and 2c confirm that this improvement is stable for different values. For our Top-k algorithm, Figures 2d, 2e, 2f confirm that this improvement is also stable for different values of .
Adaptive Sparse Vector with Gap
In this subsection we present the evaluation of our novel Adaptive-Sparse-Vector-with-Gap to show that it can answer more above-threshold queries than Sparse Vector and Sparse-Vector-with-Gap at the same privacy cost. First note that Sparse Vector and Sparse-Vector-with-Gap both answer exactly the same amount of queries, so we only need to compare Adaptive-Sparse-Vector-with-Gap to the original Sparse Vector [19, 32] .
In both algorithms, the budget allocation between the threshold noise and query noise (e.g., 0 and 1 in Algorithm 1) is set according to the ratio 1 : (2k) 2 3 instead of 1 : 1, following recommendations for SVT by Lyu et. al. [32] (the privacy properties of our algorithms do not change). The threshold is set to be the 95% quantile in each dataset and all reported numbers are averaged over 20, 000 runs.
Number of queries answered. We first compare the number of queries answered by each algorithm as the parameter k is varied from 2 to 25 with a privacy budget of = 0.7 (results for other settings of the total privacy budget are similar). The results are shown in Figure 3a , 3b, and 3c. In each of these bar graphs, the left (blue) bar is the number of answers returned by Sparse Vector and the right bar is the number of answers returned by Adaptive-SparseVector-with-Gap. This right bar is broken down into two components: the number of queries returned from the top "if" branch (corresponding to queries that were significantly larger than the threshold even after a lot of noise was added) and the number of queries returned from the middle "if" branch. Queries returned from the top branch of AdaptiveSparse-Vector-with-Gap have less privacy cost than the queries returned by Sparse Vector. Queries returned from the middle branch of Adaptive-Sparse-Vector-with-Gap have the same privacy cost as in Sparse Vector.
In the case of the BMS-POS and T40100K datasets, we see that most queries are answered in the top branch of Adaptive-Sparse-Vector-with-Gap, meaning that the above- threshold queries are generally large (much larger than the threshold). Since Adaptive-Sparse-Vector-with-Gap uses more noise in the top branch, it uses less privacy budget to answer those queries and uses the remaining budget to provide additional answers (up to an average of 15 more answers when k was set to 25).
In the kosarak dataset, we see that roughly half the queries are returned in the top branch and half in the middle branch of Adaptive-Sparse-Vector-with-Gap. This suggests that many of the above-threshold queries were actually close to the threshold and so there should be less benefit in adaptivity. Figure 3b confirms this. Still, the adaptive algorithm is able to answer more queries than the original.
Precision. Although the adaptive algorithm can answer more above-threshold queries than the original, one can still ask the question of whether the returned queries really are above the threshold. Thus we can look at the precision of the returned results (the fraction of returned queries that are actually above the threshold). One would expect that the precision of Adaptive-Sparse-Vector-with-Gap should be less than that of Sparse Vector, because the adaptive version can use more noise when processing queries. In Figures 3d,  3e , and 3f we compare the precision of the two algorithms. Generally we see very little difference in precision -when returning at least 25 above-threshold answers, the adaptive algorithm has less than one additional false positive (on average).
GENERAL RANDOMNESS ALIGNMENT AND PROOF OF LEMMA 1
In this section, we prove Lemma 1, which was used to establish the privacy properties of the algorithms we proposed. The proof of the lemma requires a more general theorem for working with randomness alignment functions. We explicitly list all of the conditions needed for the sake of reference (many prior works had incorrect proofs because they did not have such a list to follow).
In the general setting, the method of randomness alignment requires the following steps. Table  1 ). In the case of local alignments this involves proving Note that this last condition (ii) is equivalent to requiring that the local alignments must be defined without using the axiom of choice (since non-measurable sets are not constructible otherwise) and for each D ∼ D , the number of distinct local alignments is countable. That is, the set {φ D,D ,ω | ω ∈ Ω} is countable (i.e., for many choices of ω we get the same exact alignment function). Let φ1, φ2, . . . be the distinct local alignment functions (there are countably many of them by Condition 4). Let Ei = {ω ∈ E | φ D,D ,ω = φi}. By Conditions 1 and 2 we have that for each ω ∈ Ei, φi is one-to-one on SD:ω and φi(SD:ω) ⊆ S D :ω . Note that SD:E i = ∪ω∈E i SD:ω and S D :E i = ∪ω∈E i S D :ω . Furthermore, the sets SD:ω are pairwise disjoint for different ω and the sets S D :ω are pairwise disjoint for different ω. It follows that φi is one-to-one on SD:E i and φi(SD:E i ) ⊆ S D :E i . Thus for any H ∈ φi(SD:E i ) there exists H ∈ SD:E i such that H = φ −1 i (H ). By Conditions 3 and 4, we have
≤ a for all H ∈ SD:E i , and |det J φ i | ≥ b (except on a set of measure 0). Then the following is true:
The second equation is the change of variables formula in calculus. The last inequality follows from the containment φi(SD:E i ) ⊆ S D :E i and the fact that the density f is nonnegative. In the case that H is discrete, simply replace the density f with a probability mass function, change the integral into a summation, ignore the Jacobian term and set b = 1. Finally, since E = ∪iEi and Ei ∩ Ej = ∅ for i = j, we conclude that
We now present the proof of Lemma 1. 
The first inequality is by triangular inequality. The Lemma now follows by Theorem 4.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we introduced the Adaptive Sparse Vector with Gap, Noisy Max with Gap, and Noisy Top-K with Gap mechanisms, which were based on the observation that the classical Sparse Vector and Noisy Max mechanisms could release additional information at no cost to privacy. The construction and proof of these mechanisms was based on a simplified proof template we provided. We also provided applications of this free gap information.
Future directions include using this technique to design additional mechanisms as well as finding new applications for these mechanisms in fine-tuning the accuracy of data release algorithms that use differential privacy. Pick an adjacent pair D ∼ D and an ω = (ω1, . . . , ωs).
. . , w t ). Our goal is to show ω = ω (since that will mean φ D,D ,ω is a local alignment). Choose an i ≤ min(s, t).
• If i ∈ Iω (i.e. M (D, H) returned and a gap for query qi), then by (2) we have
Therefore, w i = wi ≥ 0 (since the noisy value of the query remains over the noisy threshold with the same gap).
• If i ∈ Iω (i.e. M (D, H) returned ⊥ for query qi), then by (2) we have
(hence the noisy query remains under the noisy threshold). The first inequality is due to the fact that the queries have sensitivity 1:
Therefore for all 1 ≤ i ≤ min(s, t), we have w i = wi. That is, either ω is a prefix of ω, or vice versa. Let q be the vector of queries passed to the algorithm and let len(q) be the number of queries it contains (which can be finite or infinity). By the termination condition of Sparse Vector we have two possibilities.
• s = len(q): in this case there are fewer than k abovethreshold answers in the first s − 1 queries, and we must have t = len(q) too because M (D , H ) will also run through all the queries (it cannot stop until it answers k above threshold queries or hits the end of the query sequence).
• s < len(q): in this case qs is the above-threshold query to reach the bound k and we must also have t = s.
Thus t = s and ω = ω. This shows that φ D,D ,ω really is a local alignment function from SD:ω to S D :ω .
A.2 Probability of Ties Among n Queries with the Discrete Laplace Distribution
Let γ be the base of the discrete laplace distribution. We will first consider the probability of a tie between two queries and then use the union bound over all pairs of queries.
Suppose η1 and η2 are two i.i.d zero mean discrete Laplace random variables with scale 1/ and base γ. Without loss of generality, let q1 − q2 = mγ ≥ 0. Then the probability that q1 + η1 = q2 + η2 is:
Since there are n queries, we can conservatively estimate the probability of a tie as the probability that any pair of n items has a tie. Using the union bound, we get the probability of a tie is at most n 2 γ . In floating point, we expect a Laplace distribution to be implemented using a Discrete Laplace with γ being close to machine epsilon, which for double-precision floating point numbers is around 2 −52 .
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4
To prove this lemma, we need some intermediate results. Pick an adjacent pair D ∼ D and an ω = (jω, gω). For a given H = (η1, η2, . . .
To establish the alignment cost, we need the following lemma and definition.
Proof. Let s be an index that maximizes xi and let t be an index that maximizes x i . Without loss of generality, assume xs ≥ x t . Then xs ≥ x t ≥ x s ≥ xs − 1. Hence |xs − x t | = xs − x t ≤ xs − (xs − 1) = 1. Counting queries have the monotonicity property.
Lemma 10. Algorithm 2 satisfies -differential privacy. If q is monotonic, then Algorithm 2 satisfies /2-differential privacy.
• If i ∈ Iω, then by (5) we have q i + ξ i − (T + η ) = q i + ξi + 1 + qi − q i − (T + η + 1) = qi + ξi − (T + η) ≥ σ.
Therefore, w i = wi.
• If i ∈ Jω, then by (5) we have q i + ξ i − (T + η ) = q i + ξi − (T + η + 1) = q i − 1 + ξi − (T + η) ≤ qi + ξi − (T + η) < σ q i + η i − (T + η ) = q i + ηi + 1 + qi − q i − (T + η + 1) = qi + ηi − (T + η) ≥ 0
The first inequality is due to the sensitivity restriction: |qi − q i | ≤ 1 =⇒ q i − 1 ≤ qi. Hence w i = wi.
• If i ∈ Iω ∪ Jω, then by a similar argument we have q i + ξ i − (T + η ) ≤ qi + ηi − (T + η) < σ, q i + η i − (T + η ) ≤ qi + ξi − (T + η) < 0.
Hence w i = (⊥, 0) = wi.
Therefore, either ω is a prefix of ω or vice versa. By a similar argument on the termination condition as before, we must have s = t and thus ω = ω. The first inequality is from sensitivity assumption. The second inequality is from loop invariant: 0 +2 1|Iω |+2 2|Jω | = cost ≤ − 2 2 + max(2 1, 2 2) = .
The proof of Lemma 6 now follows from Lemmas 13 and 14.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 3 (BLUE)
Proof. Recall that αi = qi + ξi and gi = qi − qi+1 + ηi − ηi+1 where ξi and ηi are independent Laplacian random variables with scale 2k/ and 4k/ respectively. Let
. . . Our goal is then to find the best linear unbiased estimate (BLUE) β of q in terms of α and g. In other words, we need to find a k × k matrix X and a k × (k − 1) matrix Y such that β = Xα + Y g with E( β − q 2 ) as small as possible. 
Taking the partial derivatives of Φ w.r.t Y , we have
By setting ∂Φ ∂Y = 0 we have
Recall that (ξθ T )ij = ξi(ξj − ξj+1 − ηj + ηj+1), we have 
A.8 Proof of Lemma 7
The density function of ηi − η is 
